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Employment in nonstandard work arrangements, especially part-
time employment, grew dramatically in Japan over the last two
decades, and in recent years, nonstandard jobs have accounted for the
overwhelming majority of new jobs in Japan. Although growth in non-
standard employment was not as great in the United States, evidence
suggests that the share in certain nonstandard arrangements, especially
temporary agency employment, expanded rapidly in the 1980s and
1990s.
In this chapter, we examine whether the growth in nonstandard
employment in these two countries reflects similar or unrelated forces,
and, as a corollary, why the growth in nonstandard employment was so
much greater in Japan than in the United States. In particular, we look
at potential causes of this growth: a shift in employer demand toward
arrangements that increase productivity and reduce labor costs; a shift
in the supply of workers seeking more flexible staffing arrangements;
and government policies promoting the expansion of nonstandard
employment. Finally, we examine the implications of the growth in
nonstandard employment for workers.
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DEFINITIONS OF NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT 
ARRANGEMENTS
Comparison of the magnitude of and trends in nonstandard work
arrangements in Japan and the United States is complicated by the fact
that the definitions of arrangements differ between the countries. For
instance, in U.S. statistics on part-time employment, which come from
the Current Population Survey (CPS), individuals are classified as part-
time if they usually work fewer than 35 hours per week. In Japanese
surveys, workers are classified as part-time if they work fewer hours
per day or days per week than regular workers (e.g., the Survey on the
Diversification of Employment) or if they are termed part-time in their
place of employment (e.g., the Employment Status Survey). The Japa-
nese definition of part-time, therefore, includes some individuals who
work more than 35 hours per week, and this difference between the
U.S. and Japanese statistics should be borne in mind.
In 1999, about 30 percent of Japanese workers classified as part-
time by their employers worked almost the same number of hours per
week as full-time workers (Ministry of Labor 1997a). In cases where
Japanese part-time and full-time employees work similar hours, part-
time refers to a lower status of employment within the firm. Tradition-
ally, part-time workers were hired to do relatively simple tasks requir-
ing little training and were not expected to work overtime. In contrast,
regular full-time workers would be asked to perform a wide variety of
tasks beyond their normal work duties, would be expected to work
overtime, often for no additional compensation, and might be trans-
ferred to distant offices (Sato et al. 1999). These differences, some
argued, justified the better pay, promotion opportunities, training, ben-
efits, and job security received by full-time workers compared with
part-time workers. However, since the 1980s, part-time workers have
been given more responsibility and training by companies, and differ-
ences in the scope of tasks performed by part-time and regular full-
time workers are narrowing (Miyama 1991; Ministry of Labor 1997b,
1999).1
Temporary workers in Japan are hired on a contract for a limited
duration. Often the distinction between temporary workers and day
laborers is made. The former are hired for one month or longer, while
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the latter are hired for less than one month. In addition, some Japanese
surveys make the distinction between temporary and contract workers;
the latter have professional skills and are hired on fixed-term contracts.
The data on temporary workers in the United States are not comparable
to the Japanese data. In the figures reported below, temporary workers
in the United States are defined as workers who indicate their job is
temporary for economic, rather than personal, reasons, as reported in
recent supplements to the CPS, and thus the definition of temporary
worker is somewhat broader in the United States than in Japan. Both
Japanese and U.S. surveys report employment in temporary help agen-
cies.2
TRENDS IN NONSTANDARD ARRANGEMENTS
Table 6.1 shows the levels of and trends in part-time, temporary,
and temporary agency employment in Japan and the United States in
the 1980s and 1990s. The fraction of the workforce that is part-time has
been similar in Japan and the United States in recent years, although
the part-time statistics in Japan include some employees who work
more than 35 hours per week. The proportion of the workforce that is
temporary is much higher in Japan than in the United States, although
the share of employees who work for temporary help agencies is
smaller. 
The most striking trend in Japan has been the dramatic rise in the
share of part-time employment. Part-time employment grew from 11.0
percent to 18.8 percent of paid employment and accounted for 45 per-
cent of the net growth in paid employment from 1982 to 1997. It
accounted for 77 percent of the net growth in paid employment from
1992 to 1997. Published statistics on part-time employment in the
United States would suggest that the share of paid employment that is
part-time rose modestly in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the CPS,
from which part-time statistics are derived, was redesigned in 1994 and
part-time statistics before and after the redesign are not comparable.
Adjusting for the redesign, the share in part-time employment rose
slightly in the 1980s but fell in the 1990s.3
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Table 6.1 Trends in Nonstandard Employment (as percentage of paid 
employment)
United States
The share of Japanese employment in temporary help agencies
rose steadily in recent years, albeit from a very small base. Regulation
of the temporary help industry was relaxed in 1999, and further growth
is expected. In the United States, temporary help employment
expanded rapidly, increasing its share of nonfarm payroll employment





1982 11.0 3.7 7.9 NA
1987 14.2 3.1 8.9 0.2
1992 16.1 2.8 8.4 0.3
1997 18.8 2.6 9.2 0.5








1982 18.2 20.0 0.5
1989 17.0 18.7 1.1
1999 17.4 17.4 4.1 2.5
Δ1979–99 –0.6 NA NA
Δ1982–99 –2.6 NA 2.0
a Change from 1987–97.
SOURCE: Figures on U.S. part-time employment were derived from the Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS) and are expressed as a percentage of total employment. Figures
for the years 1979, 1982, and 1989 were adjusted to account for the redesign of the
CPS and to make them comparable to the 1999 figures. The figure on U.S. temporar-
ies comes from the February 1999 supplement to the CPS. The figures for agency
temporaries represent the percentage of nonfarm payroll employment in the Help
Supply Services Industry, which is primarily composed of temporary help agencies.
These data come from the Current Employment Statistics (CES) series. Japanese data
come from Bureau of Statistics Management Coordination Agency, Employment Sta-
tus Survey.
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about 10 percent of net employment growth in the 1990s, according to
the U.S. Bureau of Statistics establishment survey (Current Employ-
ment Statistics). 
Although the share of day laborers in Japan fell over the period, the
share in other temporary contracts rose.4 It appears that most of the
growth in temporary contracts is accounted for by the growth in tempo-
rary part-time contracts. According to the Ministry of Labor, the frac-
tion of part-time workers reporting that they were on a temporary
contract grew from 30.4 percent in 1990 to 40.6 percent in 1996.
Among workers in other nonstandard arrangements, such as temporary
agencies, the fraction who were in temporary contracts also grew dra-
matically over the period.5 The survey from which we computed tem-
porary employment in the United States was first conducted in 1995.
Between 1995 and 1999, there was little change in the fraction of tem-
porary workers in the United States.
The employment categories reported in Table 6.1 overlap. To gain
a better sense of the overall size of the workforce in nonstandard
employment arrangements, we constructed mutually exclusive catego-
ries of employment for the most recent years of data available for
Japan and the United States (Table 6.2).6 If one defines standard work-
ers as those who work full-time and who are not temporary, and non-
standard as everyone else, then the levels of nonstandard employment
are similar in the two countries. In Japan, 76.5 percent of wage and sal-
ary workers are in regular, full-time jobs compared with 78.5 percent in
the United States. However, within nonstandard employment arrange-
ments, the fraction that is temporary is much higher in Japan than in the
United States. 
It is also noteworthy that at least half of temporary agency workers
in both countries do not report themselves as holding temporary jobs.
In Japan, many temporary agency workers still have a regular employ-
ment contract with the agency. In the United States, this finding is a bit
puzzling, but suggests that many temporary agency workers believe
that their employment with the temporary agency is relatively secure,
even if their assignments with clients change.7
Overall, these data suggest that the growth in nonstandard employ-
ment arrangements has been much stronger in Japan than in the United
States. Although temporary agency employment has grown rapidly in
the United States, at least in percentage terms, nothing comparable to
180 Houseman and Osawa
the dramatic Japanese rise in part-time employment has been recorded
in the United States. This conclusion is subject to the caveat that data
for some types of nonstandard employment arrangements have only
recently been collected in the United States and, thus, direct evidence
on trends in these arrangements is not available. Evidence from several
employer surveys suggests that U.S. companies increased their use of
direct-hire temporaries, contract company workers, and independent
Table 6.2 Distribution of Employment by Employment Arrangement and 






Temporary Sum 1 + 2
Full-time 76.5 0.6 77.1
Part-time 9.6 9.2 18.8
Shokukakua 1.2 0.6 1.8
Temporary agency 0.3 0.2 0.5
Other 0.7 1.2 1.9





Temporary Sum 1 + 2
Full-time 78.5 1.4 79.9
Part-time 14.8 1.4 16.2
On-call or day 
laborer
1.3 0.6 1.9





Total 95.9 4.1 100
a Shokukaku are employees who do not have a formal labor contract and are asked to
perform a specific task for the company.
SOURCE: Data for Japan come from special tabulations of the Bureau of Statistics
Employment Status Survey. Figures for the United States were tabulated by the
authors from the February 1999 supplement to the Current Population Survey.
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contractors in the 1980s and 1990s (Conference Board 1995; Abraham
and Taylor 1996; Abraham 1990; Houseman 2001). 
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WORKERS IN NONSTANDARD 
ARRANGEMENTS
Table 6.3 shows the distribution of part-time, temporary, and tem-
porary agency workers in Japan and the United States by gender and
age and the incidence of each nonstandard arrangement within age-
gender cells. Although women in both countries are more likely than
men to hold part-time or temporary jobs, the male-female differentials
are much less in the United States than in Japan. The incidence of tem-
porary employment and temporary agency employment is only slightly
higher among women than men in the United States. 
Although there is a higher incidence of part-time employment
among American than Japanese men, temporary employment is more
common among Japanese men. This reflects a difference in the type of
employment found among the youngest and oldest working men in the
two countries. Younger and older American working men are more
likely to be employed part-time, while in Japan, those age groups dis-
play a greater incidence of temporary employment. Among women,
older (65 and over) and teenage American women have higher rates of
part-time employment compared with Japan, whereas rates of part-time
employment are higher among prime-age women in Japan. Temporary
employment is much higher among Japanese women than American
women in all age brackets.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT 
FOR WORKERS
The growing number of workers in nonstandard arrangements has
raised concern primarily because these jobs are often associated with
low wages, few benefits, and little job security. Below, we study evi-
dence on the extent to which these stereotypes are, in fact, true. Fur-
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Table 6.3 Distribution and Incidence of Nonstandard Employment by 
Gender and Age in Japan and the United States (%)
Age and 
gender 
Part-time Temporary Temporary agency













































































































































































































NOTE: Figures in parentheses are the percentage within the group that are part-time, tempo-
rary, or temporary agency workers.
SOURCE: Figures for Japan come from the 1997 Employment Status Survey, Bureau of
Statistics. Figures for part-time employment in the United States are authors’ tabulations
from the outgoing rotation groups of the 1999 Current Population Survey. Figures for tem-
porary and temporary agency employment in the United States come from the authors’
tabulations of the February 1999 supplement to the CPS. 
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ther, where differentials between workers in regular and nonstandard
arrangements exist, we examine why they exist.
Wages
In the United States, the average wages of part-time, direct-hire
temporary, on-call, and temporary agency workers are much lower than
those of regular full-time workers. Using a variety of methodologies
and data sets, a number of studies have attempted to carefully control
for differences in measured and unmeasured human capital between
workers in nonstandard and regular jobs. These studies generally have
found that workers in nonstandard arrangements still earn significantly
less than those in regular jobs.8 Low wages in nonstandard arrange-
ments would be of little concern if the workers in these jobs were sec-
ondary earners from middle-income or wealthy families. However,
workers in all nonstandard work arrangements are much more likely to
come from families living below or near the poverty line (100 to 125
percent of the poverty line). In 1995, 6 percent of regular full-time
workers lived at or near the poverty level compared with 22 percent of
temporary agency workers, 16 percent of on-call and day laborers, 12
percent of contract company workers, 15 percent of direct-hire tempo-
raries, and 14 percent of regular part-time workers.9
As in the United States, the average hourly wage of Japanese work-
ers in nonstandard arrangements is considerably less than that of work-
ers in regular full-time positions. Using cross-section microdata from
the 1989 Survey on the Status of Part-Time Workers conducted by the
Japan Institute of Labor, we estimated wage models for full-time and
part-time women.10 One interesting result from these estimates is that
variables measuring human capital, such as education and tenure, have
a much smaller effect on part-time workers’ wages than on those of
full-time workers. The very low return on tenure experienced by part-
time workers is consistent with the fact that part-time workers are not
covered by the nenko wage system prevalent in Japan, in which
employees’ wages are closely tied to their age and tenure.11
Figure 6.1 shows the results of a simulation, based on estimates
from these wage models, of a wage-tenure profile for a part-time and a
full-time worker with the same characteristics. Initially, the wages of
the full-time and part-time worker are virtually identical. As the tenure
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of the two workers increases, however, the wage gap grows.12 This sim-
ulation illustrates the problem faced by Japanese companies, which are
saddled with older workers receiving high wages; the incentive is to
hire part-time workers to reduce wage costs, given that the workforce
is expected to continue to age. 
One might argue that the steeper wage-tenure profile of full-time
workers reflects greater growth in productivity, perhaps because full-
time workers receive more training. However, this explanation is
unlikely to completely account for the wage differential between part-
time and full-time workers. Wage-tenure profiles are much steeper in
Japan than in the United States. Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) note
that if the steeper wage-tenure profile reflected greater growth in firm-
specific human capital, then the age of retirement should be later in
Figure 6.1 Wage-Tenure Profiles of Part-Time and Full-Time Workers, 
Japan
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis using data from the Survey on the Status of Part-Time
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Japan than in the United States. In fact, the average age of mandatory
retirement is considerably lower in Japan than in the United States. In
addition, 68 percent of Japanese firms report having a system called
saikoyoseido, in which retired workers are rehired at a much lower sal-
ary (Ministry of Labor 1999). This practice also indicates wages of
older regular workers are often above their revenue marginal product.13
Benefits
In both Japan and the United States, laws governing benefits often
do not apply to those in nonstandard arrangements. In Japan, employ-
ers are not obligated to pay social security, disability, and unemploy-
ment insurance taxes for many part-time and temporary workers.14 In
addition, if the worker earns less than 1.3 million yen in a year, he or
she may be regarded as a dependent of the household head, and the
employer need not pay the social security premium. As a dependent,
however, the worker is still entitled to a basic pension. Everyone in
Japan is required to be enrolled in some form of health insurance, and
paid employees generally are enrolled in company-provided health
insurance plans. Payment of the health insurance premium is financed
through a payroll tax, the cost of which is shared by the employer and
the employee. However, employers are not required to provide health
insurance to those working less than three-fourths the hours of regular
workers. If the worker earns less than 1.3 million yen per year, then he
or she is entitled to coverage as a dependent under the household
head’s policy.15 Thus, this tax structure, in which many part-time and
temporary workers receive benefits as dependents, lowers the tax costs
to these workers and their employers and promotes nonstandard
employment.
In the United States, employers must pay social security and unem-
ployment insurance taxes on all workers whose earnings are above
some minimal amount, although workers in nonstandard arrangements
who then become unemployed often do not meet threshold earnings or
hours requirements to qualify for unemployment insurance. State
workers’ compensation laws often exempt domestic, farm, and other
casual labor, but otherwise cover most workers.
U.S. law does not require that companies provide workers with
benefits, such as a private pension plan and health insurance, but it
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does provide substantial tax incentives for employers to provide these
benefits. If employers choose to provide their employees with these
benefits (and they and their employees take advantage of the tax bene-
fits), the provision of the benefit is subject to regulation. The regula-
tions seek, among other things, to ensure that benefit plans and
associated tax breaks broadly benefit employees in the company, not
just highly compensated employees. However, many part-time, on-call,
and direct-hire temporary employees are not covered by these regula-
tions. Moreover, because independent contractors, contract company
workers, and temporary agency workers are not employees of the
establishment for which they perform work, they are not covered by a
client company’s benefit plans. One concern is that benefit regulations
in the United States provide incentives for companies to use nonstand-
ard work arrangements to avoid paying benefits to certain groups of
workers.
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 provide information on the percentage of work-
ers in nonstandard and regular full-time arrangements receiving
selected benefits in Japan and the United States. In the Japanese data,
workers were asked whether or not they were enrolled in a particular
program. Regular full-time workers were not asked if they were cov-
ered by employment insurance, health insurance, or the employee’s
pension insurance program because, by law, all regular full-time
employees must be enrolled in these programs. With the exception of
transferred employees, workers in all nonstandard arrangements are far
less likely than regular full-time workers to receive all types of bene-
fits. Receipt of benefits is especially low among part-time and tempo-
rary workers in Japan, although if workers in nonstandard
arrangements are married and earn less than 1.3 million yen per year,
they are entitled to basic pension and health insurance coverage
through their spouse.
U.S. workers in all nonstandard arrangements are much less likely
than regular full-time employees to have health insurance or a retire-
ment plan through their employer. Moreover, they are much less likely
to be eligible to receive these benefits from their employer.16 Unlike the
situation in Japan, there is no universal health insurance program in the
United States. The low levels of employer-provided health insurance
among workers in nonstandard arrangements would be of little concern
if these workers generally had health insurance from another source.
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Table 6.4 Benefits Received, by Employment Arrangement, Japan (%)














Employment insurance — 50.1 65.1 69.9 45.7 31.3 80.9 63.0
Health insurance — 40.3 67.9 65.7 33.3 29.9 80.8 58.9
Employee’s pension 
insurance
— 38.1 67.1 61.4 31.9 12.2 78.1 54.1
Private enterprise annuity 55.5 8.3 63.2 9.6 4.4 1.9 14.2 11.6
Lump sum retirement 
payment
90.5 16.1 84.2 15.4 10.9 8.4 26.8 25.3
Provision of bonus 
payment
95.9 49.1 88.6 28.8 45.9 51.1 66.6 45.1
Recreation facility 70.0 35.3 82.9 46.2 30.2 15.8 58.8 40.7
NOTE: The statistics are based on individuals’ responses to questions about their benefits. Employee’s pension insurance is a compul-
sory pension plan enrolled by the company.
SOURCE: Ministry of Labor, Survey on the Diversification of Employment, 1999.
188Table 6.5 The Incidence of Health Insurance and Retirement Plans, by Employment Arrangement, United States 
(%)
Health insurance Retirement plan
Health











pension plan or 












43.0 9.0 27.9 20.1 4.3 9.5
On-call or day 
laborers
68.5 21.2 30.1 38.0 22.2 25.9
Contract company 
workers
84.2 59.5 76.4 55.4 39.2 46.3
Direct-hire 
temporaries
74.9 26.3 34.6 26.7 19.8 23.3
Regular part-time 
employees
76.3 17.2 31.6 33.0 21.3 25.9
Regular full-time 
employees
88.2 73.4 84.2 70.4 64.2 69.4
SOURCE: Authors’ tabulations from February 1999 CPS Supplement on Contingent and Alternative Work Arrangements.
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Although many workers in nonstandard arrangements do have health
insurance coverage outside their place of employment, temporary
agency workers, on-call workers, direct-hire temporaries, and regular
part-time workers are still much less likely than regular full-time work-
ers to have health insurance coverage. Health insurance coverage is
especially low among temporary agency workers; only 43 percent have
any health insurance. Workers in the United States are allowed to save
money in tax-deferred retirement accounts if they do not participate in
an employer-sponsored pension plan. However, the fraction of workers
who have some private retirement plan is still dramatically less among
workers in all nonstandard arrangements compared with workers in
regular full-time jobs. 
One might suspect that workers in nonstandard arrangements
receive fewer benefits than regular full-time workers because they
have less human capital or are concentrated in occupations and indus-
tries in which the incidence of benefits is lower. Yet, even controlling
for demographic and job characteristics, workers in nonstandard
arrangements are significantly less likely than regular full-time work-
ers to be eligible to participate in an employer-sponsored health insur-
ance or pension plan or to have health insurance or a retirement plan
from any source (Houseman 1997).
Job Security
Part-time and temporary workers in Japan enjoy less job security,
legally and in practice, than regular full-time workers. In addition to
the fact that regular full-time workers receive implied commitments of
lifetime employment at large- and medium-sized companies, the
employer must provide advance notice and have some compelling rea-
son for dismissing workers (Matsuda 1992; Schregle 1993). In con-
trast, companies may easily dismiss temporary workers by not
renewing their contract. Court rulings regarding job protection
afforded regular part-time workers have been contradictory. However,
about half of part-time workers are on temporary contract. The hiring
of part-time workers on temporary contract is especially common at
large companies, which offer strong job security to their regular full-
time employees. By placing part-time workers on temporary contract,
companies clarify that part-time workers do not have implicit guaran-
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tees of lifetime employment. Studies of fluctuations in part-time and
temporary employment support the view that workers in these posi-
tions have less job security and help buffer workers in regular full-time
jobs (Houseman and Osawa 1994, 1998).
There is little basis for believing a priori that U.S. workers in non-
standard employment arrangements have less job security than those in
regular full-time jobs. Although many U.S. companies avoid laying off
core workers during downturns, an implied commitment of lifetime
employment is rare in the United States, and the employment-at-will
doctrine, in which employers have the right to hire and fire workers at
will, still largely operates. Nevertheless, employment-at-will has been
weakened by laws that prohibit employers from discriminating against
workers because of their race, sex, religion, ethnicity, age, or disability
and by court rulings that afford employees certain protections against
dismissal when their employer has given them an implied commitment
of employment. In addition, research suggests workers in certain non-
standard arrangements have less job security than those in regular jobs.
Based on administrative data from the State of Washington, Segal and
Sullivan (1997a) find that the average duration of employment for
workers in the temporary help industry is substantially less than that
for workers in other industries. In a study of labor market transitions,
temporary agency workers, on-call workers, direct-hire temporaries,
contract company workers, and regular part-time workers were more
likely than comparable regular full-time workers to be with a different
employer, be unemployed, or be involuntarily out of the labor force
one month and one year later. In addition, the study found that a sub-
stantial share of the modest decline in job stability over the last decade
can be attributed to the growth in temporary agency employment
(Houseman and Polivka 2000).
WHY HAS NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT GROWN SO 
MUCH FASTER IN JAPAN THAN IN THE UNITED STATES?
There are many basic similarities in the phenomenon of nonstand-
ard employment in Japan and the United States. For example, the over-
all levels of nonstandard employment are similar in the two countries
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(though the incidence of temporary employment is much higher in
Japan); young and old workers and women are disproportionately rep-
resented in nonstandard employment arrangements; and workers in
nonstandard arrangements tend to earn lower wages, receive fewer
benefits, and have less job security than those in regular full-time posi-
tions, even controlling for differences in worker and job characteristics. 
However, what differ between the two countries are recent trends
in nonstandard employment. The share in nonstandard employment
arrangements has increased dramatically in Japan, largely because of
the growth in part-time employment. In contrast, the share in part-time
employment has declined in the United States over the last decade, and
although the share in temporary agency employment has risen rapidly,
it still represents a relatively small share of total employment. In ana-
lyzing and comparing trends in nonstandard employment in Japan and
the United States, we seek to answer two fundamental questions. First,
why has part-time employment, including temporary part-time
employment, grown so dramatically in Japan while falling in the
United States? Second, are the forces underlying the growth in tempo-
rary agency employment and other nonstandard arrangements in the
United States similar to those underlying the growth in nonstandard
arrangements in Japan? In other words, are we observing similar phe-
nomena, albeit on different scales and in different mixes of nonstand-
ard arrangements, in the United States and Japan, or do the trends in
nonstandard arrangements signal a divergence in the industrial rela-
tions practices in the two countries?
Why Has Part-Time Employment Grown in Japan?
No simple demand- or supply-side story can account for the rapid
growth in part-time employment in Japan. Decompositions show that
the growth in part-time employment cannot be attributed to a shift in
the industrial composition of employment toward industries that inten-
sively use part-time workers. Nor can it be attributed to a shift in the
demographic composition of the workforce toward groups that desire
more part-time work. Rather, the growth in part-time employment is
attributable almost entirely to an increase in the incidence of part-time
employment within industries and within demographic groups. In fact,
what is quite striking about the growth of part-time employment in
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Japan is how widespread the phenomenon is. The incidence of part-
time employment has increased dramatically among both men and
women and in almost all age groups and industries (Houseman and
Osawa 1998). In addition, the growth in part-time employment cannot
simply be attributed to the long recession that has plagued the Japanese
economy since the 1990s. Although the recession may have acceler-
ated the growth of part-time employment, the share in part-time
employment began increasing rapidly well before the recession of the
1990s. 
We argue that the rapid increase in part-time employment is driven,
in large part, by demand-side forces and reflects strains in the Japanese
industrial relations system. Increased demand by firms for part-time
workers has been accommodated, to some degree, by an increased sup-
ply of women workers, who have sought part-time employment
because of the decline in opportunities for self- and family employ-
ment. Finally, public policy has encouraged the growth of part-time
employment by providing substantial tax incentives for firms to hire
part-time workers and for workers to take part-time jobs. 
Strains in the Japanese industrial relations system
Two prominent features of Japanese industrial relations are life-
time employment and nenko (seniority-based) wages. This industrial
relations system, which first emerged prior to World War II, became
the norm in large firms after the war. It also strongly influenced work-
ing conditions in medium- and small-sized firms. Under the nenko
wage system, in theory, workers are initially paid wages below their
marginal revenue product, but as tenure rises they eventually are paid
more than their marginal revenue product. For war-devastated Japan,
nenko wages depressed initial wage outlays, thereby freeing up funds
for capital investment. The system was sustainable because the work-
force was young and the economy rapidly growing, thus ensuring that
the age structure of a firm’s workforce would be pyramid shaped.
Workers favored this system because wages rapidly rose just as work-
ers’ family-related expenditures increased (Nakatani 1987). 
Providing job security facilitated the introduction of new technolo-
gies on the factory floor. With the widespread adoption of new technol-
ogies after the war, firms were compelled to provide continuous in-
house training. Knowing that jobs would not be lost as a result of inno-
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vation, workers did not oppose its introduction. Knowing that their
own interests were tied to the fate of their firms, workers also became
more committed to their companies, an inclination reinforced by pater-
nalistic employment practices. In this way, the lifetime employment
and turnover-depressing nenko wage system represented a long-term
social contract between companies and workers. 
The structure of financial markets also supported these post-war
industrial relations practices. Given the prevalence of cross-share hold-
ing arrangements (related keiretsu firms, or friendly firms, would con-
trol large blocks of a firm’s shares) and access to bank loans at low
rates, firms could focus on expanding market share and long-term prof-
its without worrying about pressures to boost quarterly earnings. Thus,
financial markets exerted little pressure on companies to trim the labor
force during business cycle downturns.
Some of the forces that made the Japanese employment system
logical for much of the post–World War II period have changed, creat-
ing pressures on businesses to adopt new practices. One is the changing
demographic composition of the workforce. The birth rate in Japan has
been steadily falling since World War II, and accompanying the decline
has been a graying workforce with higher job tenure. The increase in
tenure increases companies’ wage costs because, under the nenko sys-
tem, wages rise sharply with tenure and this rise is not matched by
increases in productivity. Because the number of people in their twen-
ties is declining dramatically, the problem of an aging workforce will
not be alleviated in the near future. 
At the same time that employers’ wage costs have been rising, Jap-
anese businesses have come under tremendous pressure to lower labor
costs in the face of decelerating economic growth, massive debt bur-
dens—especially in manufacturing—and increased international com-
petition with the opening of Japanese markets. Trade liberalization has
resulted not only in the growth of imports, but also in a surge of foreign
direct investment, with leading banks, insurance companies, and auto
companies coming under foreign control. Although in the past, the
close relationship between Japanese companies and banks allowed
them to focus on long-term growth and market share, Japanese busi-
nesses now face foreign shareholders and banks who expect short-run
profitability (Alexander 2000).
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In sum, firms currently have workforces that are top-heavy with
older, highly paid, but less productive workers at a time when cutting
costs and raising productivity are necessary in the face of heightened
global competition. Japanese firms have responded by trimming
bonuses, cutting overtime, dispatching workers to subsidiaries, and
forcing older workers into early retirement. To make wages more
responsive to performance, some companies have begun determining
wages on an annual basis (nenposei). However, the implicit social con-
tract that has developed over the years makes it difficult for companies
to introduce sweeping changes to their industrial relations practices in
rapid fashion without causing loss of morale and risking productivity
declines among regular workers. As a result, we argue, many compa-
nies have continued to protect their core workforce, while expanding
the size of their nonstandard workforce, especially part-time workers,
who do not receive nenko wages and implied commitments of job
security.17
Increase in employers’ demand for part-time workers
The evidence on the growth of part-time employment in Japan is
generally consistent with our demand-side explanation. Figure 6.2
depicts the natural logarithm of the number of job vacancies and appli-
cants for full-time and part-time workers over the 1975–2000 period.18
If the growth in the stock of part-time workers over the period were
driven by a growth in employer demand, we would expect the growth
in job vacancies for part-time workers to exceed the growth in part-
time job applicants. This is the pattern observed during the 1980s,
which was a period of economic expansion in Japan. During the 1980s,
job vacancies for part-time workers also grew rapidly relative to the
growth of job vacancies for full-time positions.
During the early 1990s, when the economy first went into reces-
sion, job vacancies for both full-time and part-time positions fell. Since
the early 1990s, job vacancies for part-time positions have soared,
more than doubling between 1993 and the second quarter of 2000,
while vacancies for full-time positions have continued to decline.
Applicants for part-time and full-time positions have risen steadily dur-
ing the 1990s. By 2000, there was a large gap between job applicants
and vacancies for full-time positions, indicating an excess supply of
workers for full-time regular jobs at existing wage levels. It is widely
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presumed that the rapid growth of part-time workers in the 1990s dur-
ing Japan’s severe recession was demand driven, and the data in Figure
6.2 are consistent with this analysis. However, the vacancy data in Fig-
ure 6.2 suggest that the growth in the expansionary years was also led
by demand forces. 
The patterns of growth in part-time employment by age and gender
also are consistent with a theory of demand-driven growth. If busi-
nesses have been substituting part-time workers for full-time workers
on the margin when they hire, we would expect that increases in the
incidence of part-time employment would be most dramatic among
demographic groups with a high share of new entrants or reentrants to
the workforce. Indeed, this is precisely the pattern observed. The inci-
dence of part-time employment grew dramatically among young men
and women. For instance, between 1982 and 1997 the incidence of
Figure 6.2 Logarithm of Job Vacancies and Job Applicants for Full-Time 
and Part-Time Jobs, Japan
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part-time employment grew from 19 percent to 47 percent among
working men ages 15 to 19, and from 15 percent to 59 percent among
working women ages 15 to 19. The rise in part-time employment was
also dramatic for working women over 40, who are likely to be reenter-
ing the workforce after rearing children, and among men age 65 and
over, who are likely to be taking on a bridge job to retirement.
Finally, evidence from employer surveys is consistent with an
increase in employer demand for part-time workers. Table 6.6 reports
results from the 1994 and 1999 Ministry of Labor Survey on the Diver-
sification of Employment on the principal reasons businesses hired
additional part-time workers. By far, the most common reason busi-
nesses cite for increasing the number of part-time workers is to save
personnel costs. In addition, the fraction of businesses citing labor cost
savings grew between 1994 and 1999. There is also evidence that busi-
nesses are increasingly hiring part-time workers to facilitate employ-
ment adjustment. The latter finding is consistent with the fact that the
fraction of part-time workers on temporary contract, and hence who are
easier to dismiss, has grown dramatically. The notion that businesses
are increasingly hiring part-time workers because of supply-side con-
straints is not supported by these data. Whereas 20 percent of busi-
nesses cited difficulty in hiring full-time workers as a reason for hiring
part-time workers in 1994, about half that percentage cited this factor
in 1999. 
Supply-side and public policy factors
Although structural changes in Japan’s economy have placed
strains on the current industrial relations system and resulted in an
increased demand for part-time workers by firms, structural economic
changes also may have increased the supply of workers seeking part-
time positions. Nitta (1999) and Nagase (1997; this volume) note that
the growth in part-time employment has paralleled the decline in fam-
ily- and self-employment. Nagase argues that part-time jobs, like fam-
ily- and self-employment, are much more flexible than regular jobs and
enable women to accommodate family demands. She posits that the
decline in opportunities in family- and self-employment in recent
decades led to an increase in the supply of women seeking part-time
jobs. Thus, an increase in women seeking these jobs likely helped to
accommodate the increase in demand for part-time workers.
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Table 6.6 Principal Reasons for Increasing Nonstandard Employment among Japanese Businesses Expecting to 











Difficult to hire full-time 
workers
20.3 9.3 10.9 16.0 8.5 20.6 10.2 14.3 7.5
Specialize core workers in 
more important task
— 14.6 12.2 — 14.2 — 9.1 — 11.5
Respond to increase in 
professional task
9.5 11.5 11.6 37.8 23.8 14.7 11.8 57.1 42.4
Want to hire person with 
experience and skill
6.5 10.6 14.2 22.9 31.0 8.5 13.3 19.8 34.6
Respond to economic 
fluctuation (facilitate 
employment adjustment)
20.7 26.9 24.8 18.6 26.2 20.7 34.3 8.8 19.0
Respond to long operation 
time
19.7 23.9 17.3 3.1 6.0 9.8 11.6 5.8 6.2
Respond to fluctuating 
workload over a day or 
week













Respond to seasonal or 
temporary business 
fluctuation
15.8 19.1 18.2 12.1 22.8 36.2 36.3 10.0 6.5
Save personnel costs 52.3 61.5 59.1 35.9 40.3 28.7 45.3 19.6 33.8
Hire retirees 5.2 5.5 7.0 2.0 0.9 11.6 7.6 13.6 18.0
Replacement of workers for 
taking child care leave, or 
care for aged parent
— 4.7 4.0 — 7.5 — 4.9 — 4.6
Other 7.4 6.1 6.4 5.7 5.8 9.1 3.2 7.1 7.0
a Work fewer hours per day or days per week than regular employees.
b Work fewer hours per day or days per week than regular workers, and employed on a contract lasting more than one month or no spe-
cific period.
c Work much the same hours per day or days per week as regular workers, employed on a contract lasting more than one month or no spe-
cific period, and classified as part-time in workplace.
d Day laborers are not included in the 1999 data.
e On-call workers are not included in the 1999 data.
SOURCE: Ministry of Labor, Survey on the Diversification of Employment, 1994, 1999.
The Growth of Nonstandard Employment in Japan and the United States 199
Public policies have also encouraged the growth in part-time
employment in Japan by providing significant tax incentives to busi-
nesses to hire part-time workers and to workers to accept part-time
positions. As noted above, if the part-time worker is married and earns
less than 1.3 million yen in a year, he or she can be regarded as a
dependent and thus need not pay the social security or health insurance
premium, but remains entitled to receive the health insurance or basic
pension on retirement.19
Similarly, workers earning up to 1,030,000 yen per year do not pay
taxes on their income, and, if they are married, their spouse may claim
a dependent deduction from his or her income taxes (currently 380,000
yen) and may receive a dependent allowance from his or her employer.
If a worker’s income exceeds this level, not only must he or she pay
taxes on income, but, if married, the spouse will lose his or her depen-
dent tax deduction and may forfeit (in about 40 percent of the cases)
the family allowance paid by the employer. This tax and compensation
structure creates a significant financial incentive for married women to
work part-time and earn less than this income threshold. Many part-
time women in Japan, especially the highly educated, reduce their
hours of work specifically to avoid exceeding the annual income
threshold (Nagase 1998). According to the Ministry of Labor’s Survey
on Part-Time Workers, the fraction reporting that they adjusted their
working hours so that their earnings would fall below the threshold
level increased from 26 percent in 1990 to 32 percent in 1995.
The tax thresholds should also have the effect of depressing hourly
earnings of part-time workers relative to full-time workers. Interest-
ingly, although we have argued above that the employer demand for
part-time workers has increased relative to supply, contrary to what one
would expect under this scenario, the wages of part-time workers have
actually fallen relative to those of full-time workers. Nagase (this vol-
ume) argues that these tax incentives and their depressing effect on
part-time wages may help explain this paradox.20
Why Has the Share in Part-Time Employment Fallen 
in the United States?
While the share of the Japanese workforce in part-time employ-
ment rose sharply in both the 1980s and 1990s, the share of the U.S.
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workforce in part-time employment rose modestly in the 1980s and fell
in the 1990s (Table 6.1). These divergent trends reflect differences in
both supply- and demand-side forces in the two countries.
Table 6.7 provides a decomposition of changes in the part-time
employment share across demographic groups from 1979 to 1989 and
from 1989 to 1999 in the United States.21 The change in the rate of part-
time employment may be decomposed as follows:
(1) )P = G)PiWi + GPi)Wi + G)Pi)Wi                                    
where i indexes the demographic group; Pi is group i’s rate of part-time
employment, and Wi is group i’s share of paid employment. Thus, the

















(3) – (5)1979 1989 1979 1989
Teens 54.0 64.0 8.2 5.8 0.8 –1.3 –0.2 –0.7
Men 6.3 7.8 53.5 51.4 0.8 –0.1 –0.0 0.7
Women 26.5 25.6 38.3 42.8 –0.3 1.2 –0.0 0.8
Column 
sum
1.3 –0.2 –0.3 0.8
1989–1999
1989 1999 1989 1999 ΔPW PΔW ΔPΔW
Sum
(3) – (5)
Teens 64.0 66.7 5.8 5.4 0.2 –0.2 –0.0 –0.1
Men 7.8 7.7 51.4 50.8 –0.1 –0.1 0.0 –0.1
Women 25.6 22.5 42.8 43.9 –1.4 0.3 –0.0 –1.1
Column 
sum
–1.3 –0.0 –0.0 –1.3
NOTE: Data on part-time and employment shares for 1979 and 1989 were adjusted to
account for changes to the CPS in 1994. We used the adjustment factors provided in
Polivka and Miller (1998). Numbers are in percentages. See text for explanation of
decomposition.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from Current Population Survey, U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1979, 1989, 1999.
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change in the aggregate rate of part-time employment may be decom-
posed into three terms: the part owing to changes in the employment
shares across groups, the part owing to changes in the rates of part-time
employment within groups, and the interaction of these two effects.
The 1979 and 1989 employment shares and rates of part-time employ-
ment were adjusted for the redesign of the CPS.22
None of the increase in the rate of part-time employment between
1979 and 1989 may be attributed to a shift in the composition of
employment toward workers who supply more part-time employment.
Both women and teens have a high rate of part-time employment, and
the increase in the share of employment accounted for by women was
offset by the fall in the employment share of teens. The rise in the share
of part-time employment, instead, is accounted for entirely by an
increase in the incidence of part-time employment among teens and
adult men; the incidence of part-time employment actually fell among
adult women.
Decompositions not reported here show that the decline in the rate
of part-time employment among adult women in the 1980s is entirely
attributable to a decline among married women. Interestingly, the
decline in the rate of part-time employment among married women
occurred at a time when their labor force participation soared. Using
data on the gross flows of women across labor force states, Williams
(1995) finds that the reason part-time employment declined among
women was because they were more likely to stay in full-time jobs and
were less likely to exit from the labor force or into part-time jobs. 
Why did full-time employment among married women increase in
the 1980s? Several facts are inconsistent with a demand-side explana-
tion (i.e., that firms were increasing their demand for full-time jobs):
part-time employment actually increased among adult men and teens;
the transitions from unemployment into full-time employment did not
grow; and although women’s wages were rising relative to men’s over
the period, this increase began before the 1980s, when the incidence of
part-time employment among women was growing. Williams (1995)
suggests that the rise in full-time employment among working women
may be attributed to an increase in the availability of child care over
the period, making the opportunity costs of full-time employment rela-
tive to part-time employment lower. This theory is consistent with find-
ings that the rise in full-time employment occurred because married
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women (who are more likely to have children at home) with full-time
jobs were less likely to drop out of the labor force or switch to part-
time jobs. Nevertheless, the availability of child care is not exogenous,
and presumably the increased availability was a response to an increase
in the demand for these services by women, who faced greater opportu-
nities and social acceptance in the workplace. Changing job opportuni-
ties and societal attitudes, in turn, are related to a complex set of
factors, including equal employment laws passed in the United States
in the 1960s.
In contrast to the situation in the United States, many married Japa-
nese women prefer part-time positions because of the declining avail-
ability of family- and self-employment. Because of the costs and
restrictions (e.g., drop off and pick up times) of child care, the declin-
ing number of multigenerational households (i.e., the availability of in-
house day care), and rising elder care responsibilities, many women
prefer part-time to full-time employment to accommodate family
responsibilities (Osawa 1998; Sato 1998). The reason the supply of
child care services in Japan has not expanded to meet working
women’s needs, as it has in the United States, may be related to the fact
that equal employment opportunity laws are much weaker and were
introduced much later in Japan than in the United States, and the
opportunities for full-time employment for Japanese women have
lagged behind those for American women.
The share in part-time employment fell between 1989 and 1999 in
the United States. This decline may be attributed entirely to a decline in
the incidence of part-time employment among women. The incidence
of part-time employment among teens actually rose, while the inci-
dence of part-time employment among adult men remained about the
same. Changes in the demographic composition of the workforce by
themselves would have led to no change in the share of part-time
employment in the economy. Although one might argue that tighter
labor markets in 1999 compared with 1989 were responsible for the
decline in part-time employment, this demand-side story is inconsistent
with the fact that part-time employment rose among teens and
remained stable among adult men. The trend in the 1990s is consistent
with a supply-side story that women continued to shift to full-time
work, possibly owing to greater availability of child care, rising rela-
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tive wages, and changing expectations about women’s roles in the
workforce and in the family.
GROWTH IN OTHER NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT 
ARRANGEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
The divergent trends in part-time employment in the United States
and Japan reflect quite different demand, supply, and institutional
forces in the two countries. Nevertheless, the share in other types of
nonstandard employment has risen in both the United States and Japan.
Here, we examine the causes of the growth in other nonstandard
employment arrangements in the United States and ask whether there
are similarities between these developments and the growth of part-
time employment and other nonstandard arrangements in Japan. 
The growth in temporary agency employment has received the
most attention in the United States. Given that the majority of tempo-
rary agency workers say they would prefer a regular job, it is generally
argued that the rapid growth in temporary agency employment is
largely driven by employer demand. Existing studies suggest several
reasons for the rapid growth in temporary employment in the United
States. 
American companies, like Japanese companies, arguably sought to
increase productivity and cut costs in recent years in response to
domestic and international competitive pressures. One way American
companies have done this is by more closely tailoring staffing levels to
actual workload, thereby reducing average staffing levels and using
temporary agency workers only when necessary. In this way, compa-
nies use temporaries to increase workforce flexibility in response to
fluctuations in workload. In a survey of American businesses con-
ducted by the Upjohn Institute, 37 percent of those reporting a recent
increase in temporary agency workers stated the need to respond to
fluctuations in workload as a reason for the increase (Houseman 1997).
Another 37 percent of surveyed employers cited difficulty in find-
ing qualified workers on their own, and 24 percent cited screening
workers as reasons for increasing their use of temporary agency work-
ers. The tight labor markets prevailing in the United States in the 1990s
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made it difficult for companies to recruit adequate staff without signifi-
cantly increasing wages. The growth of temporary agency employment
may have reduced pressure on companies to raise wages during the
prolonged expansion and facilitated the use of more risky, less-quali-
fied workers. As a practical matter, if employers raise wages for new
hires, they must also raise the wages for their existing workforce. How-
ever, if existing workers face significant costs in changing jobs,
employers may exercise wage discrimination between marginal and
inframarginal workers by using new workers through temporary help
agencies. The temporary help agency is the official employer of the
new hires and pays them the higher wages. There is some case study
evidence to suggest that this is occurring in the United States, particu-
larly in higher-paid, skilled occupations in short supply (Houseman,
Kalleberg, and Erickcek 2003).
Especially in low-skill jobs, employers may be willing to use less-
qualified candidates through temporary help agencies until they are
able to recruit qualified candidates on their own. Alternatively, they
may be willing to try out less-qualified candidates through a temporary
help agency and then hire them as permanent employees if they prove
themselves during a trial period. Temporary agency workers often
receive lower wages and typically receive fewer benefits than they
would as a regular employee. Particularly if a company offers generous
benefits to its regular workers, using temporary agencies during a pro-
bationary period may be cheaper than hiring workers directly (House-
man 2001), and these lower costs may make it more attractive for
companies to try out riskier workers.23 Many companies also believe
they can more effectively screen workers through temporary agencies.
Using temporary agencies obviates the need for managers to fire work-
ers on probation. Because these workers are not employees of the com-
pany, managers simply choose not to hire them into the company; the
temporary agency staff will reassign workers not selected to another
client or handle the unpleasant task of terminating them. Arguably,
then, by using a temporary agency to screen workers, managers are less
likely to keep workers who display poor or mediocre performance dur-
ing their probationary period. 
The growing threat of legal action by dismissed employees is
another potential reason that employers are increasingly using tempo-
rary agencies to screen workers for permanent positions. Court rulings
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granting workers implied contracts to their jobs, coupled with a growth
in legal action by dismissed employees, arguably have made compa-
nies more cautious about whom they hire. Autor (2003) finds that up to
20 percent of the growth in temporary agency employment in the
United States may be attributed to the growth of implied contract law. 
The growth in temporary agency employment in Japan is largely
related to the deregulation of this sector in recent years. Prior to 1986,
temporary staffing agencies were prohibited by the Employment Secu-
rity Act of 1947, with an exception for those run by trade unions.
Union-run agencies were not allowed to charge for their services. In
1986, the government passed legislation to permit temporary staffing
agencies to supply workers to perform 11 specified tasks. In 1995, this
law was amended to cover 26 job categories. The Labor Dispatching
Law of December 1, 1999, greatly expanded the jobs in which tempo-
rary agency workers could be employed. The current law no longer
specifies the job categories in which temporary agency workers are
permitted, but rather provides a short list of occupations in which they
are prohibited. Temporary agency employment is expected to grow
rapidly in the coming years as a result of this deregulation. 
Among Japanese employers who in 1999 expected to increase their
use of temporary agencies, the most common reason given was to save
on personnel costs, as was the case with part-time workers (Table 6.6).
The percentage citing personnel cost savings increased slightly from
1994 to 1999. The percentage citing the need to hire someone with
experience and skill also increased. Moreover, a growing number of
employers appear to be using temporary agency workers to respond to
seasonal or cyclical fluctuations in workload, thereby buffering core
workers from such demand fluctuations. Unlike the situation in the
United States, the difficulty of finding full-time workers has never
been an important reason why Japanese employers use temporary
agency workers and has become even less important over time. 
Evidence points to some growth in the share of Japanese workers
in temporary and contract jobs.24 As noted, the growth in temporary
contracts stems from an increase in the fraction of part-time and other
nonstandard workers who are on temporary contract. And as is the case
for these other employment arrangements, there has been a large
increase in the fraction of employers who cite personnel cost savings
and the ability to facilitate employment adjustment or respond to sea-
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sonal or temporary business fluctuations as a reason for using more
temporary workers. With respect to the latter, Japanese companies, like
American companies, have reduced staffing levels in response to com-
petitive pressure to increase productivity and reduce costs. These lower
staffing levels, in turn, give rise to a greater demand for nonstandard
employment arrangements to accommodate workload fluctuations. The
economic slowdown plaguing the Japanese economy in the 1990s con-
tributed to economic uncertainty and fueled demand for a more flexible
workforce. In addition, a large fraction of Japanese employers are
using contract employees because of their experience and skill.
Available evidence points to a growth in contracting out in the
United States as well, for reasons that are similar to those given by Jap-
anese companies. Like Japanese companies, American companies
often contract out work to tap the special skills of contract workers, to
accommodate demand fluctuations, and to lower labor costs, especially
by avoiding fringe benefits costs (Kalleberg, Reynolds, and Marsden
2003). Contracting out to lower labor costs has been an especially con-
tentious issue between American unions and management.
Thus, if we set aside the decline in part-time employment in the
United States, there are broad similarities in the development of non-
standard employment in the two countries. Where nonstandard
employment arrangements have increased, employer demand has
played an important role in their growth. Companies in both countries
are under competitive pressures to increase productivity and reduce
labor costs, and they have used nonstandard employment arrangements
to this end. In some respects, the growth of temporary agency employ-
ment and contracting out in the United States is similar to the growth in
part-time and other nonstandard employment in Japan.
Nevertheless, the overall growth of nonstandard employment in
Japan dwarfs that of the United States, and this fact reflects fundamen-
tally different conditions facing employers in the two countries. The
economic slowdown, the aging of the workforce, and an industrial rela-
tions system characterized by steep wage profiles and strong job secu-
rity for regular full-time employees were important drivers of growth
in nonstandard employment arrangements in Japan. These pressures
were largely absent in the U.S. economy.
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CONCLUSION
About a quarter of wage and salary workers are in some type of
nonstandard employment in the two countries. Although the share in
part-time and temporary agency employment is similar in Japan and
the United States, a much higher fraction of Japanese part-time work-
ers are on temporary contract. This probably reflects the fact that regu-
lar full-time workers in Japan have greater job security than do regular
full-time employees in the United States, and hence firms have a
greater need for temporary workers to absorb fluctuations in workload.
Each country has experienced growth in at least certain types of
nonstandard employment, although the magnitude of that growth has
been much greater in Japan than in the United States. Concern in each
country over this growth arises primarily because workers in nonstand-
ard employment arrangements, on average, receive lower wages, fewer
benefits, and less job security than regular full-time workers. In both
countries, lower benefits and job security are at least partly the conse-
quence of labor laws and regulations designed to protect workers.
Because these laws often do not apply to workers in part-time, tempo-
rary, or other nonstandard arrangements, government policy creates an
incentive for firms to use these arrangements to circumvent the costs of
such regulation. 
According to economic theory, if labor markets are perfectly com-
petitive, workers will pay for the mandated benefits through lower
wages or other compensation.25 However, if minimum wage laws limit
a drop in wages or if labor markets are not perfectly competitive and
government regulations increase labor’s bargaining power, workers
covered by the mandate will earn higher total compensation. Evidence
in the United States and Japan supports the latter interpretation. Work-
ers in nonstandard arrangements, who often are not covered by these
mandates, receive lower wages and benefits than regular full-time
workers, who are typically covered by these mandates. One caveat for
Japan is that married workers in nonstandard arrangements who qual-
ify as dependents enjoy significant tax breaks and still are entitled to
the basic pension and health insurance benefits. To our knowledge, no
research has explicitly compared the after-tax incomes or benefit enti-
tlements (whether through an employer or as a dependent) of regular
208 Houseman and Osawa
full-time and nonstandard workers in Japan. It is likely, however, that
comparisons of pretax wages overstate the differential between regular
and nonstandard workers in total after-tax compensation.
Where nonstandard employment arrangements are growing,
demand-side forces play an important role in both countries. Japanese
and U.S. firms, under pressure to lower labor costs by increasing labor
productivity and reducing wage and benefits costs, have increased their
use of nonstandard employment arrangements. Although companies in
both countries face similar competitive pressures, the pressures on Jap-
anese firms are greater. An industrial relations system in which labor
costs of regular full-time workers are much less flexible than in the
United States, coupled with a rapidly aging workforce and an opening
of trade and financial markets to international competition, have cre-
ated tremendous pressures on Japanese firms to hire nonstandard work-
ers to increase workforce flexibility and lower labor costs.
Moreover, labor supply and government policies have accommo-
dated increased demand to a greater extent in Japan than in the United
States. The decline in family- and self-employment, the lack of child
care alternatives outside the home, and tax incentives have increased
the supply of married women seeking part-time jobs in Japan. In the
United States, in contrast, the incidence of part-time employment
among married women has declined, probably reflecting a combination
of factors, including government policies to end employment discrimi-
nation against women, rising relative wages of women, and a greater
availability of child care services outside the home. This decline in the
rate of part-time employment among married women mitigated the
growth in the aggregate rate of part-time employment in the 1980s and
led to a decline in the aggregate rate of part-time employment in the
1990s. 
There is some evidence that Japanese firms are moving away from
the nenko wage system and lifetime employment for regular, full-time
workers in response to current demographic and economic pressures.
Such changes in the Japanese industrial relations system would reduce
the differential treatment of regular full-time and nonstandard workers.
However, Japanese firms’ primary response has been to dramatically
increase the number of nonstandard workers who are not covered by
these industrial relations practices. Arguably, this has led to an
increase—rather than a decline—in labor market segmentation that is
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fundamentally different in scope from that occurring in the United
States. 
Notes
1. Some government surveys recently began distinguishing between part-time and
“arubaito” jobs, though they are similar. Most part-time workers are housewives
and most arubaito are students, although in recent years the arubaito category
increasingly has included nonregular, nonstudent employees. Below, we group
part-time and arubaito workers together in the statistics we report. It is possible to
use data from the Labor Force Survey, which includes information on hours
worked, to construct a Japanese part-time statistic more comparable to that for the
U.S. However, because so many Japanese part-time workers work almost the
same hours as full-time workers, we chose to use Japanese definitions when
reporting part-time statistics for Japan.
2. The Japanese word haken is often translated as dispatched worker. To make it
comparable to the U.S. terminology, we translate haken as temporary agency
worker.
3. The adjustments we make in Table 6.1 to the U.S. part-time statistics are based on
Polivka and Miller (1998).
4. Figures reported in this chapter from the Bureau of Statistics’ Employment Status
Survey are consistent with those from another commonly cited source, the Minis-
try of Labor’s Labor Force Survey, although the latter shows a smaller decline in
the day laborer employment share and greater growth in the temporary employ-
ment share. While the Employment Status Survey questions individuals on their
usual labor market status, the Labor Force Survey collects data on individuals’
actual status in the last week of the survey month. 
5. These figures come from the Ministry of Labor, Status of Part-Time Workers
(Paato Taimaa no Jitsujo), 1996. The fraction of workers in nonstandard arrange-
ments besides part-time who reported being on temporary contract rose from 44.6
percent in 1990 to 66.6 percent in 1996. Because part-time workers account for
the overwhelming percentage of workers in nonstandard employment and a negli-
gible percentage classified as regular full-time workers are on temporary contract,
part-time employment accounts for most of the growth in temporary contracts
(see Table 6.2).
6. Part-time workers and temporary agency workers may also be temporary workers
in both countries. In the United States, part-time workers may also be temporary
agency workers. In the Japanese data, temporary agency and part-time workers
are mutually exclusive categories. The data sources and calculations done for this
special tabulation are available from the authors.
7. Data on temporary agency workers in Table 6.2 come from the CPS, not the CES,
as reported in Table 6.1. The percentage of workers classified as agency temporar-
ies is smaller in the CPS than in the CES, and it is generally believed that the CPS
undercounts the number of workers in temporary help agencies. For a discussion
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of the discrepancy between the CPS and CES figures, see Polivka (1996). Only
CPS data allow the distinction between temporary agency workers who consider
their job temporary and those who do not. 
8. Hotchkiss (1991) finds that correcting for sample selection bias slightly increases
the estimated wage differentials between part-time and full-time workers. Com-
paring the wages of part-time and full-time workers within occupations within
establishments, Lettau (1997) finds that hourly wages of part-time workers are, on
average, 16 percent lower, and total hourly compensation for part-time workers is,
on average, 48 percent lower. The main exception in the literature to the finding
that part-time workers earn less than full-time workers is Blank (1990), who
reports that after controlling for sample selection, part-time women earn more
than full-time women, though part-time men still earn significantly less than full-
time men. Segal and Sullivan (1997b; 1998) use longitudinal data to control for
individual fixed effects in studies of wage differentials between temporary agency
workers and other workers. They find that temporary agency workers earn signif-
icantly less than other workers, though their estimates of this wage differential
range from 3 to 20 percent.
9. These figures are based on the authors’ calculations using matched data from the
March and February 1995 CPS.
10. These estimates are described in greater detail in Houseman and Osawa (1998).
11. The lower wages of Japanese part-time workers may result, in part, from the fact
that many have a strong preference for working close to home. To the extent that
employers enjoy some monopsony power with part-time workers, but not with
full-time workers who are willing to accept employment with a larger, geographi-
cally dispersed group of employers, part-time workers’ wages will be depressed
relative to full-time workers’ wages. From the part-time workers’ perspective, the
lower wage level is compensated for by the proximity of their job to home. 
12. We also estimated models with a Heckman selection correction to take into
account the possibility that unmeasured variables are correlated with the decision
to work part-time and bias ordinary least squares estimates. These models suggest
that, in the absence of sample selection bias, the wage gap between full-time and
part-time workers would be even greater.
13. As discussed below, steep wage-tenure profiles may be a profit-maximizing strat-
egy even if the wage increases do not match increases in worker productivity. 
14. Specifically, employers are not required to pay social security taxes on the wages
of workers who work less than three-fourths of regular workers’ hours and dis-
ability and unemployment insurance taxes on workers who work fewer than 20
hours per week or who are expected to work less than one year.
15. If employees work less than three-fourths the hours of regular employees but earn
more than 1.3 million yen, they are required to take out their own health insurance
policy and pay the premium.
16. We report the percentage who are eligible to participate because many American
workers choose not to participate in these benefit programs. 
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17. Although we do not provide a formal model of the increase in demand for part-
time workers, this growth is consistent with two theoretical explanations. One is
that employers, seeking to maximize profits, adopt efficient industrial relations
systems. Here, changing demographics, slower growth, and more volatile eco-
nomic conditions in the face of liquidity constraints would cause managers to
optimally hire relatively more part-time workers in recent years. Alternatively,
firms, shielded from international competition and subsidized by the government,
have not been maximizing profits or adopting efficient industrial relations prac-
tices, at least in recent years. Changing demographics and the opening of markets
are forcing firms to become efficient. 
18. Distances on a logarithmic scale, multiplied by 100, approximate percentage dif-
ferences. 
19. See Abe (2000) for an analysis of the impact of the social security system on mar-
ried women’s labor supply.
20. The increase in tenure associated with the aging workforce also implies that the
wages of regular full-time workers, who receive tenure-based wage increases
under the nenko system, will rise relative to the wages of part-time workers, who
typically do not receive nenko wage increases.
21. These years all represent business cycle peaks, and therefore rates of part-time
employment should be minimally affected by cyclical factors.
22. We apply the adjustment factors in Polivka and Miller (1998) to our data. They
provide adjustment factors for teens, adult men, and adult women, and so we are
limited to these three demographic groups in our analysis for the 1989–1999
period.
23. Hiring temporary agency workers on a quasi-permanent basis may also be
cheaper, and allegedly many companies use “perma-temps” to avoid paying bene-
fits to certain groups of workers. However, hiring workers on a permanent basis
through temporary agencies in order to avoid paying workers benefits is illegal
under U.S. law, and this practice has been challenged in the courts in recent years.
24. See Table 6.1 for figures on temporary contracts. The Survey on the Diversifica-
tion of Employment provides figures on contract workers, who are defined as
workers with professional skills on fixed-term contract. (The contracts of these
workers are often renewed.) Employment in this category increased from 1.7 per-
cent to 2.3 percent of paid employment between 1994 and 1999, even though the
1994 figure included on-call workers not included in the 1999 survey.
25. An exception occurs when workers do not fully value the benefits. See Gruber
(2000) for a theoretical discussion of this issue.
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